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In Connecticut v. Teal,1 the United States Supreme Court rejected the
bottom line defense in an employment discrimination case brought under
title VII.2 This defense, previously accepted by a majority of the Federal
courts that had addressed the issue' and included in the 1978 Uniform
Guidelines on Employment Selection Procedure (U.G.E.S.P.),' allowed
an employer to utilize a selection procedure that had a disproportionate
impact on protected groups if the employer compensated for that impact
elsewhere in its selection process. In rejecting the bottom line argument,
the Supreme Court held that title VII prohibited any procedures that im-
posed "barriers" and "deprive[d] ...any individual of employment op-
portunities."5 According to Teal, individuals excluded from a selection
process because of a test with a disparate impact' were entitled to protec-
tion under title VII regardless of any subsequent remedial actions taken
by the employer to ensure that there was no ultimate disparate impact in
the selection process as a whole.
The Supreme Court's opinion, however, did not clearly preclude all use
of the bottom line defense. In his dissent in Teal, Justice Powell suggested
that under the Court's ruling a multicomponent employment process,7 in
which a variety of measures were used collectively for selection with no
single factor or sub-test constituting a pass-fail barrier beyond which an
applicant could not compete further, would still be protected by the bot-
1. 457 U.S. 440 (1982).
2. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1982).
3. See Smith v. Troyan, 520 F.2d 492 (6th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 934 (1976); Kirk-
land v. New York State Dep't of Correctional Servs., 520 F.2d 420 (2d Cir. 1975); Brown v. New
Haven Civil Serv. Bd., 474 F. Supp. 1256 (D. Conn. 1979). But see Johnson v. Goodyear Tire and
Rubber Co., 491 F.2d 1364 (5th Cir. 1974); EEOC v. Trailways, Inc., 530 F. Supp. 54 (D. Colo.
1981). The type of bottom line defense rejected in these latter two cases, however, differed from that
described in this Note in that it focused on the percentage of minorities in the general population as
opposed to the percentage in the applicant class.
4. 29 C.F.R. § 1607.4(c) (1988). These regulations remain in force despite the Supreme Court's
decision in Teal.
5. 457 U.S. at 448 (emphasis in original).
6. For a discussion of the disparate impact standard, see infra text accompanying note 11.
7. Multicomponent procedures generally rely on a number of different selection standards that
may be based on merit, diversity, equity, or other concerns. These procedures are termed universalis-
tic, while pass-fail tests, due to their emphasis on a particular standard, are termed particularistic. A
bottom line defense could be invoked for a multicomponent procedure when one of the selection stan-
dards has a disparate impact, but the procedure as a whole does not.
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tom line defense.' Subsequent to Teal, the Federal circuits have split on
the question of the use of the bottom line defense by employers utilizing
multicomponent selection procedures."
This Note argues that the holding in Teal should not govern multicom-
ponent processes. Although a multicomponent process, like a pass-fail test,
may ultimately lead to the rejection of an individual job applicant due to a
standard that has a disparate impact on minority or female applicants,'"
such a standard will not foster the same perceptions of unfair process and
racial or sexual inequality that are fostered by a pass-fail test. These per-
ceptions impose barriers to job opportunities for minority and female job
candidates, thus contradicting the purposes behind title VII which the
Court sought to protect in Teal.
Section I of this Note provides background on the bottom line defense
and on the Supreme Court's ruling in Teal. Section II describes the split
that has developed in the circuits since Teal and examines the opposing
arguments. Section III offers a new perspective on the bottom line contro-
versy by examining the divergent effects of pass-fail barriers and mul-
ticomponent techniques on public perceptions of racial and sexual equal-
ity. Finally, Section IV argues that the conflict over the bottom line
defense should be resolved by giving legal weight to the effect of pass-fail
barriers and multicomponent techniques on public perceptions of racial or
sexual equality, since these perceptions are intimately related to the ulti-
mate achievement of equal opportunity.
I. BACKGROUND ON THE BOTTOM LINE DEFENSE AND TEAL
Eleven years prior to Teal, the Supreme Court, in Griggs v. Duke
Power Co.," established the disparate impact test for liability under title
VII. This test outlawed facially neutral employee selection practices that
resulted in the hiring or promotion of disproportionately fewer minority
or female candidates unless the selection practice was shown to be job-
related. Following Griggs, employers began to revise their employment
practices in order to satisfy the new legal standard. In attempting to con-
tinue "merit" selection, many employers combined standardized tests or
other selection procedures that had a disparate impact on minority candi-
8. Powell reasoned:
Another possibility is that employers may integrate consideration of test results into one overall
hiring decision based on that "factor" and additional factors. Such a process would not, even
under the Court's reasoning, result in a finding of discrimination on the basis of disparate
impact unless the actual hiring decisions had a disparate impact on the minority group.
457 U.S. at 463 n.8 (Powell, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
9. See infra notes 30-32.
10. See Chamallas, Evolving Conceptions of Equality Under Title VII: Disparate Impact Theory
and the Demise of the Bottom Line Principle, 31 UCLA L. REv. 305, 359 (1983); Scanlan, The
Bottom Line Limitation to the Rule of Griggs v. Duke Power Company, 18 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 705,
737 (1985).
11. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
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dates with race- or sex-based affirmative action programs.1" Although this
approach often excluded a higher percentage of minorities or women at a
preliminary stage of the selection process, the percentage of applicants in
these groups selected from the resulting pool of "qualified" applicants was
greater than that of white males. Thus, at the end of the selection process,
the "bottom line," minority and female applicants were accepted at a rate
at least equal to that of white male applicants. Because no disparate im-
pact appeared after the final stage of the employment process, employers
argued that they need not prove the job-relatedness of the challenged se-
lection standard which by itself had a disparate impact.1
During the decade between Griggs and Teal, the Supreme Court, while
not directly ruling on the bottom line defense, began to lay a foundation
for its use. In a series of cases, the Court rejected title VII claims by
relying, at least in part, on evidence that the end result of the employers'
selection processes showed that an adequate percentage of minority appli-
cants had been hired.'4 The decision in United Steelworkers v. Weber"
further supported the possibility of the bottom line defense. In Weber, the
Court reviewed an employer's affirmative action plan which was being
challenged by qualified, yet unsuccessful, white job applicants. The plan
at issue in Weber was similar to those often used in bottom line ap-
proaches to compensate for the disparate impact of intermediate testing
procedures. A ruling that such a remedial plan constituted improper re-
verse discrimination would have severely limited the availability of the
bottom line approach. The Court, however, upheld the plan, affirming the
potential availability of this critical feature of the bottom line strategy.
While the Supreme Court was lending indirect support to the bottom
line principle, lower Federal courts were directly rejecting claims brought
12. See Blumrosen, The Bottom Line Concept in Equal Employment Opportunity Law, 12 N.C.
CENT. L.J. 1, 3-4 (1980).
13. This past Term, in Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 109 S. Ct. 2115 (1989), the Supreme
Court shifted the burden of proof in cases in which a disparate impact is found. Although employers
still have the burden of production in showing that a challenged selection process with disparate
impact is job-related, plaintiffs now bear the ultimate burden of persuasion to prove that the process is
not job-related. Thus, an employer who unsuccessfully asserts the bottom line defense no longer has
the burden of proving that the challenged procedure was job-related. The employer must still, how-
ever, defeat the plaintiff's initial showing that the procedure was not job-related, a burden that would
not be present if the bottom line defense were successful.
This argument does not reach cases of discriminatory intent. Evidence of discriminatory intent at
any stage could be sufficient to prove a title VII violation. Cf Village of Arlington Heights v. Metro-
politan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 270 n.21 (1977) (evidence of discriminatory purpose shifts
burden to defendants to prove action would have been taken absent such purpose).
14. See New York City v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568, 584 n.25 (1979) (title VII claim defeated where
employer hired minority workers at rate double that found in work force at large); Washington v.
Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 235-36 (1976) (employer's overall recruitment and hiring of minorities led to
relaxation of EEOC standards for testing); Espinoza v. Farah Mfg. Co., 414 U.S. 86, 86 (1973)
(Court rejected Mexican-American's employment discrimination claim based on finding that 90% of
employees were Mexican-Americans); see also Blumrosen, supra note 12, at 6-11 (discussing above-
cited cases as supporting bottom line defense).
15. 443 U.S. 193 (1979).
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by black applicants against bottom line selection procedures."6 In Smith v.
Troyan,7 for example, the Sixth Circuit rejected a disparate impact claim
brought by black police applicants by relying on the equal selection rates
at the bottom line. The court reasoned:
That blacks fare less well than whites on the AGCT, a "subtest" in
the process of hiring East Cleveland police officers, is insufficient in
itself to require defendants to justify the AGCT as being job-related.
Carried to its logical extreme, such a criterion would require the
elimination of individual questions marked by poorer performance
by a racial group, on the ground that such a question was a "sub-
test" of a "subtest." 18
Against this backdrop, Winnie Teal and three other black state employ-
ees sued the Department of Income Maintenance of the State of Connecti-
cut for using an examination with a disparate impact as part of its promo-
tion process.19  Candidates who failed the Department's written
examination were excluded from further consideration for promotion. Ap-
proximately one month before the case came to trial, the defendants made
their first promotions from the eligibility list. The promotion decisions
resulted in a higher percentage of blacks from the original applicant pool
being promoted (23%) than whites (13.5%).20
The district court accepted the Department's bottom line defense and
dismissed the action for failure to prove a prima facie case. 1 On appeal,
however, the Second Circuit reversed. Although upholding the reasoning
in Troyan with regard to subtests within a selection process, the court
held, "Where. . .an identifiable pass-fail barrier denies an employment
opportunity to a disproportionately large number of minorities and pre-
vents them from proceeding to the next step in the selection process, a
different result must obtain." 2
The Second Circuit distinguished Troyan on the grounds that a pass-
fail barrier, unlike the multicomponent selection procedure at issue in
Troyan, would not require the court to "examine each component of an
entire application process . . . on a course that has no boundaries and no
16. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
17. 520 F.2d 492 (6th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 934 (1976).
18. Id. at 498. It is important to note that the bottom line defense presupposes that the selection
criteria have not been shown to be job-related.
19. The written examination, which was not shown to be job-related, had resulted in a passing
rate of 54.17% for blacks, approximately 68% of the rate at which white applicants passed (79.53%).
Teal v. Connecticut, 645 F.2d 133, 136 (2d Cir. 1981), affld, 457 U.S. 440 (1982).
20. Id.
21. Id. at 134 (district court opinion unpublished); ef Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S.
405, 425 (1975) (prima facie case proved if tests in question select applicants for hire or promotion in
racial pattern significantly different from that of pool of applicants).
22. Teal, 645 F.2d at 138 (emphasis added).
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clear end." 23 The court reasoned, "In the case of a pass-fail barrier, both
the discriminatory component and the affected individuals are readily
identifiable. Courts are under an obligation to entertain the claims of indi-
viduals who have been victimized by a discriminatory pass-fail barrier,
notwithstanding any belated 'corrective' action taken by the employer."24
The United States Supreme Court affirmed the Second Circuit's hold-
ing.25 The Court did not address the distinction raised by the Second Cir-
cuit between pass-fail barriers and multicomponent processes, however.
Instead, the Court focused on the language of section 703(a)(2) of title
VII, which the Court had previously found to prohibit "artificial, arbi-
trary, and unnecessary barriers to employment [that] . . . limit . . . or
classify . . . applicants for employment . . . in any way which would
deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities."26
The Court held that the test employed by the Connecticut Department of
Income Maintenance constituted such a barrier. The Court found that the
purpose of title VII was to protect individuals,2" and held, therefore, that
the ultimate promotion of other minority applicants did not negate the
plaintiffs' claim. In the closing passages of its opinion, the Court focused
on the underlying purposes of title VII which were violated in the case:
"Requirements and tests that have a discriminatory impact are merely
some of the more subtle, but also the more pervasive, of the 'practices and
devices which have fostered racially stratified job environments to the dis-
advantage of minority citizens.' 2
By resting its decision on "barriers" to individuals' "employment op-
portunities," and by failing to address the distinction raised by the Second
Circuit between pass-fail barriers and multicomponent selection processes,
the Court left the door open for employers to assert that multicomponent
approaches were not covered by the Teal decision.29 Moreover, as will be
discussed in Section IV, the Court's concern with preventing selection pro-
cedures which "foster[] racially stratified job environments" lends support
to the argument that its holding was primarily intended to prohibit the
use of the bottom line defense in the case of pass-fail tests.
II. THE SPLIT IN THE CIRCUITS
In the years following Teal, the circuits have divided on the question of
whether the bottom line defense applies to multicomponent selection tech-
niques. Courts in the Second and Sixth Circuits support the use of the
23. Id. (citing Brown v. New Haven Civil Serv. Bd., 474 F. Supp. 1256, 1262 (D. Conn. 1979)).
24. Id. at 139.
25. Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440 (1982).
26. Id. at 448 (quoting Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971) (emphasis in
original)).
27. Id. at 455.
28. Id. at 456 (quoting McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 800 (1973)).
29. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
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bottom line defense in the context of multicomponent tests."0 Courts in the
Fifth, Seventh, and Eighth Circuits, while not explicitly addressing mul-
ticomponent procedures, have used language in rejecting bottom line de-
fenses that appears to limit their holdings to pass-fail barriers.3 ' The First
and Third Circuits, on the other hand, have rejected the bottom line de-
fense in cases involving multicomponent selection processes.32 The Su-
preme Court has not indicated a willingness to resolve this split in the
circuits. In May 1988, the Court avoided confronting this issue by deny-
ing certiorari in Brunet v. City of Columbus,"3 a case in which the bottom
line defense was upheld for a multicomponent selection process.
A. Arguments in Favor of the Bottom Line Defense
Courts and legal scholars who accept the bottom line defense for mul-
ticomponent processes focus on the concept of "barriers" to employment
opportunities. 34 They argue that a multicomponent approach does not im-
pose barriers to employment opportunities because every applicant is
given the opportunity to compete at every stage of the employment deci-
sion, regardless of a poor showing at any one level. Thus, an individual
applicant is given an opportunity to compensate for an inadequate show-
ing at one stage of the process by scoring high at a later stage.
This argument, which limits the interpretation of "barriers" to pass-fail
tests, provided the basis for the Southern District of Ohio's holding in
Brunet. In Brunet, several female firefighter applicants brought suit
against the Columbus Fire Department alleging that two components of
the firefighter examination, the physical test and the mechanical reasoning
test, had a disparate impact on female applicants. Neither of these compo-
nents constituted a pass-fail barrier; rather, they were each weighted fac-
tors in the overall scoring of the examination, which, taken as a whole,
did not have a disparate impact. In finding for the City of Columbus, the
district court distinguished the Supreme Court's ruling in Teal, arguing
that Teal only reached those procedures that constituted pass-fail barriers:
"[T]he written examination in Teal constituted a 'barrier' in the sense
30. See Connecticut v. Teal, 645 F.2d 133, 138-39 (2d Cir. 1981), affd, 457 U.S. 440 (1982);
Brunet v. City of Columbus, 642 F. Supp. 1214, 1224-26 (S.D. Ohio 1986), appeal dismissed, 826
F.2d 1062 (6th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 1593 (1988).
31. See Carpenter v. Stephen F. Austin State Univ., 706 F.2d 608, 622 (5th Cir. 1983); Leftwich
v. Harris-Stowe State College, 702 F.2d 686, 691 (8th Cir. 1983); Schutz v. Western Publishing Co.,
609 F. Supp. 888, 904 (N.D. II1. 1985).
32. See Wilmore v. City of Wilmington, 699 F.2d 667, 672-73 (3d Cir. 1983); Burney v. City of
Pawtucket, 559 F. Supp. 1089, 1098-1100 (D.R.I. 1983), appeal dismissed, 728 F.2d 547 (1st Cir.
1984).
33. 642 F. Supp. 1214 (S.D. Ohio 1986), appeal dismissed, 826 F.2d 1062 (1987), cert. denied,
108 S. Ct. 1593 (1988).
34. See supra note 30; see also Note, The Bottom Line Concept in Title VII Litigation: Connecti-




that it precluded candidates from further consideration. The challenged
components of the testing process here, even though lower scores on these
components may lessen a candidate's overall chance of acceptance, do not
preclude further consideration of that candidate." 5 The argument in Bru-
net borrowed much of its reasoning from the Second Circuit's holding in
Teal, which remains valid precedent in that circuit.
36
B. Arguments Opposing the Bottom Line Defense
Courts and legal scholars opposing the view articulated in Brunet3" ar-
gue that a distinction based on employment "barriers" is untenable. An
individual who scores poorly at one stage of a multicomponent testing
scheme still faces a barrier to employment opportunity. Even though the
applicant is allowed to continue through the entire employment decision-
making process, his or her chances of selection are decreased, perhaps sig-
nificantly. Thus, according to these commentators, no analytical justifica-
tion exists for distinguishing between pass-fail barriers and components in
a multicomponent process when both, in fact, act as barriers to an individ-
ual applicant's employment opportunities.
This argument provides the basis for the District of Rhode Island's re-
jection of the bottom line defense in Burney v. City of Pawtucket,38 a case
which arose out of a fact pattern similar to that of Brunet. In Burney, a
female police cadet brought suit against the Rhode Island Municipal Po-
lice Academy for its use of a physical training program and the Post
Physical Performance Test (POST-Test), both of which had a dispropor-
tionate impact on female cadets. The defendants argued that a finding of
disparate impact would be erroneous because all of the women who had
entered the Academy since the institution of the POST-Test had gradu-
ated, 3 and despite having received lower scores on the POST-Test, two-
thirds of the female graduates had finished in the top half of their class.40
The court rejected this defense, holding that "[s]uch 'bottom line' justifica-
tions had been flatly rejected by the Supreme Court in Connecticut v.
Teal . . . ."" While noting that Teal had concerned a pass-fail barrier,
the court held that "[t]he teachings of Teal... are that the end, no matter
how pristine, cannot in the context of Title VII justify tainted means.
35. Brunet, 642 F. Supp. at 1225.
36. Cf United States v. City of Yonkers, 592 F. Supp. 570, 589-90 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (citing
Second Circuit's Teal decision as reaching pass-fail barriers).
37. See supra notes 10 & 32.
38. 559 F. Supp. 1089, 1098-1100 (D.R.I. 1983), appeal dismissed, 728 F.2d 547 (1st Cir.
1984).
39. The plaintiff in this case was apparently the first female cadet to be asked to leave the Acad-
emy as a result of the physical training requirements.
40. Burney, 559 F. Supp. at 1099 & n.16.
41. Id. at 1099.
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Defendants' 'bottom line' argument is conceptually indistinguishable from
the assertions rejected in Teal .... ",'
The Third Circuit adopted a similar position in Wilmore v. City of
Wilmington.43 In that case a fire department had deprived minority
firefighters of the on-the-job experience that contributed to improved
scores on a promotion examination."' The fire department relied on the
bottom line defense, arguing that the minority firefighters had not fared
significantly worse on the examination than white firefighters. 4" The
court, relying on Teal, rejected this defense.
III. THE IMPACT OF PUBLIC PERCEPTIONS OF EMPLOYMENT
PROCEDURES
The debate over the potential future vitality of the bottom line defense
has centered on the courts' varying conceptions of what constitutes a bar-
rier to employment opportunity. In an effort to establish a clear standard
for future applications of Teal, the courts have been deciding multicom-
ponent process, bottom line defense cases based on one of two polar defini-
tions: that a barrier is anything that could possibly hinder an individual's
job opportunity4" or that a barrier is only something which absolutely
forecloses a job opportunity.47 As such, the reasoning of the two sides
seems irreconcilable. This section, however, proposes a new standard by
which the courts can judge the bottom line defense: the degree to which
employment selection procedures affect public perceptions of racial or sex-
ual equality and the consequential impact of these perceptions on equal
opportunity for job applicants. It is the position of this Note that such an
analysis provides a more reasoned approach for adjudication of future bot-
tom line defense cases than does either of the two polar positions thus far
adopted by the courts.
42. Id. at 1100.
43. 699 F.2d 667 (3d Cir. 1983).
44. The district court had found evidence of purposeful racial discrimination on the part of the
fire department in depriving the minority firefighters of this experience. Id. at 671. This finding may
have influenced the court in its decision to recognize a disparate impact claim by minority firefighters,
despite the bottom line equality of the process.
45. Minorities had actually performed better than whites on the promotional exam. Id. at 674.
46. See Burney, 559 F. Supp. at 1100 (rejecting defendant's claim that effect of disparate impact
of subtest was de minimus).
47. See Brunet v. City of Columbus, 642 F. Supp. 1214, 1226 (S.D. Ohio 1986), appeal dis-
missed, 826 F.2d 1062 (6th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 1593 (1988) (court holds that critical
premise of Teal was that challenged standard "eliminated individuals from further consideration").




A. The Role of Perceptions in Discrimination
In his book, White Racism: A Psychohistory,48 Joel Kovel argues that
prejudice is in large part maintained and perpetuated through symbols
that encourage the public to perceive inaccurate distinctions between the
races or sexes.4" Henri Tajfel, Professor of Social Psychology at the Uni-
versity of Bristol, has described the social phenomenon whereby the effects
of past discrimination provide fuel for future discrimination:
We are then confronted with a spiral effect in which the existence of
prejudice at large not only provides additional support and rewards
for hostile judgments; it also removes the possibility of a 'reality
check' for these judgements which then feed upon each other and
become more and more strongly entrenched in the form of powerful
social myths.50
Tajfel maintains that attacking these perceptions of group inequality, al-
though difficult, is the easiest way to break out of this cycle:
It is patently obvious that . . . beliefs and views about causes of
social events which are held by great masses of men are more easily
accessible to change than their motives; and that there is at least a
chance that a change of beliefs and views may affect in turn the
management of conflicts, real or imaginary.5'
Tajfel's analysis suggests a useful starting point for considering the impact
of the different hiring procedures considered in this Note.
B. The Impact of Hiring Procedures on Perceptions of Equality
While title VII doctrine has focused primarily on the end result of em-
ployment decisions, social scientists recently have become interested in the
impact of the selection procedures themselves on public perceptions.52 Jef-
frey Prager asserts that the failure to obtain public acceptance for affirma-
tive action programs has resulted primarily from the failure of society to
recognize or to address the impact of procedures such as pass-fail barriers
on the public psyche:
48. J. KovEL, WHITE RACISM: A PSYCHOHISTORY (1970).
49. Indeed, Kovel argues that "culture itself is established to maintain the world in a shape that
conforms to the symbolic needs of the ego's activity." Id. at 99. "If such an infantile response
[prejudice] can maintain such intensity in the most mature and 'normal' of adults," Kovel reasons,
"then there must be something at large in culture [i.e., symbols] to sustain it." Id. at 93-94.
50. Tajfel, The Roots of Prejudice: Cognitive Aspects, in PSYCHOLOGY AND RACE 76, 85 (P.
Watson ed. 1973).
51. Id. at 93-94; see also J. KovEL, supra note 48, at 99-100 (discussing importance of symbolic
restructuring as means of altering real world).
52. See Greenberg & Folger, Procedural Justice, Participation, and the Fair Process Effect in
Groups and Organizations, in BAsIc GROUP PROCEsss 235 (P.B. Paulus ed. 1985) (distinguishing
between distributive and procedural justice in employer decision-making).
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In responding to a pressing social problem, [employers] forgo those
procedures necessary to secure a continued legitimacy on behalf of
the public; they ignore the danger of being popularly viewed as sub-
jective, arbitrary and capricious. . . In failing to assert a rationale
for measuring probable success or a standard of success that is ap-
plied equally to all individuals, these institutional elites are helping
insure that programs of affirmative action will fail to command
broad-based popular support.53
In a companion piece, W. R. Newell considers the perceived consistency
of different selection procedures with the meritocratic liberal tradition that
underpins American culture. Newell argues that employers need to find
selective procedures that are
flexible enough to stretch the liberal understanding of merit to re-
spond to a pressing social problem without abandoning the tradi-
tional liberal reluctance to grant groups or races the same status in
principle as individuals. The difference between the acceptance of
"diversity" and the acceptance of a racial quota may seem like a
small one, but it is the difference between a conception of public
justice compatible with liberalism and one that is not.54
Pass-fail approaches in bottom line cases separate the selection decision
into a "qualifications" phase and an "affirmative action" phase, leading to
improper public perceptions at two stages. First, the pass-fail "qualifica-
tion" standard leads to a disparate impact that demonstrably favors white
males, promoting the perception that white males are, in some objective
sense, more qualified than other groups.55 Next, the employer applies a
race- or sex-based affirmative action program to assure placement of suffi-
cient numbers of minorities or women from the class of "qualified" appli-
cants. Since such particularistic selection techniques are perceived as arbi-
trary,5" minority and female applicants selected through such procedures
53. Prager, Merit and Qualifications: Contested Social Meanings and Their Impact on Affirma-
tive Action, in AFFIRMATIVE ACTION: THEORY, ANALYSIS, AND PROSPECTS 21, 40 (M. Combs & J.
Gruhl eds. 1986).
54. Newell, Affirmative Action and the Dilemmas of Liberalism, in id. at 44, 58.
55. See Lawrence, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism,
39 STAN. L. REV. 317, 373 (1987). This effect does not require a public announcement of the test
results. Many barriers, such as height and weight requirements, obviously favor the majority group
(here, males). Others, such as standardized examinations, are currently known to favor whites, see
Butler-Omololu, Doster & Lahey, Some Implications for Intelligence Test Construction and Admin-
istration with Children of Different Racial Groups, 10 J. BLACK PSYCHOLOGY 63, 65 (1984), be-
cause of either cultural-bias, see id. at 64-65, or actual skill differences in the measured areas, see
Cronshaw, The Status of Employment Testing in Canada: A Review and Evaluation of Theory and
Professional Practice, 27 CANADIAN PSYCHOLOGY 183 (1986). Where such standards are put for-
ward as being central to one's qualification for a job, they are seen as proof of white male superiority.
This perception is all the more dangerous given the fact that employers protected by the bottom line
defense need not even show that the quality standard which has a disparate impact is, in fact, related
to job performance.
56. See infra text accompanying notes 62 & 64-65.
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are often viewed as not deserving their position, both by themselves and
by white male applicants who have been passed over.57 The selection of
minority and female applicants is often perceived as charity to an "under-
skilled" group.
The perceptions that emerge from the use of pass-fail procedures are
likely to lead to barriers to future job opportunities for minorities and
women. Faced with the option of either being rejected through a "qualifi-
cation" standard which has a disparate impact and has not even been
shown to be job-related, or having their selection seen as charity, studies
show that minority and female candidates may be less likely to apply for a
job." Those minority and female applicants who do apply and are ac-
cepted, moreover, find their future job advancement opportunities continu-
ally impaired by the perception that they somehow did not merit the job
in the first place."
A series of studies conducted over the past few years has examined the
impact of selection procedures on views regarding the fairness of affirma-
tive action.60 These studies have found that women who were told that
qualifications played a role in the selection of a female applicant (i.e., that
the decision-making was universalistic or multicomponent) felt the deci-
sion to be a fair one to a significantly higher degree than did women told
that the decision was strictly based on sex, even where both groups were
told that the female possessed superior qualifications to the man."' Fur-
57. One might argue that this Note ignores the fact that the applicants had proved that they were
qualified by passing the "qualification" standard. This argument relies on the assumption that the test
is seen as sufficient, rather than necessary, evidence of skill. More fundamentally, however, studies
show that people view race- or sex-based criteria as unfair even where the beneficiary is clearly
objectively qualified. See infra text accompanying notes 60-70.
58. See infra note 63 and accompanying text.
59. Cf. Murray, Affirmative Racism: How Preferential Treatment Works Against Blacks, NEW
REPUBLIC, Dec. 31, 1984, at 18 (describing lack of respect often accorded to beneficiaries of race-
based affirmative action).
60. Rupert Nacoste, now an Associate Professor of Psychology at North Carolina State Univer-
sity, introduced a group of approximately 100 women to a role-playing situation in which a female
professor was selected over a male professor for a research grant. Half of the women were told that
the selection was ultimately based on sex; the other half were told that sex was considered only in
combination with qualifications. See Nacoste, But Do They Care About Fairness? The Dynamics of
Preferential Treatment and Minority Interest, 8 BAsIc & APPLED Soc. PSYCHOLOGY 177 (1987)
[hereinafter Nacoste, But Do They Care?]; Nacoste & Lehman, Procedural Stigma, 17 REPRESENTA-
TIVE Rss. IN Soc. PSYCHOLOGY 25 (1987); Nacoste, Selection Procedure and Responses to Affirma-
tive Action: The Case of Favorable Treatment, 9 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 225 (1985) [hereinafter
Nacoste, Selection Procedure]. The results of these studies were summarized in Nacoste, Social Psy-
chology and Affirmative Action: The Importance of Process in Policy Analysis, 43 J. Soc. IssuEs 127
(1987) [hereinafter Nacoste, Social Psychology]; see also Tougas & Veilleux, The Influence of Identi-
fication, Collective Relative Deprivation, and Procedure of Implementation on Women's Response to
Affirmative Action: A Causal Modeling Approach, 20 CANADIAN J. BEHAV. ScI./REv. CAN. SCI.
COMP. 15 (1988) (similar study on psychological impact of selection procedures on women).
61. See Nacoste, Selection Procedure, supra note 60, at 234. The two groups of women in this
study were faced with a situation that approximates that faced by women hired following multicom-
ponent or pass-fail selection procedures respectively. In the study, as in the real life situation, both
groups of women demonstrated the qualifications necessary to succeed at the given job. Women in one
of the study groups, however, were told that their ultimate selection was based solely on their gender.
These women were thus placed in a similar situation to women in the real world who are ultimately
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ther, women told that the decision was sex-based had less favorable views
of the agency that made the selection decision and were, thus, less at-
tracted to the agency.62 This finding lends empirical support to the argu-
ment made above that particularistic, as opposed to universalistic, proce-
dures create barriers to job opportunities by fostering an environment in
which minority and female candidates are less likely to apply for
positions. 63
Men who are denied employment through these procedures also viewed
the solely sex-based selection of women as being less fair than more uni-
versal selection decisions.64 One could plausibly expect, therefore, that mi-
nority or female workers selected through such a particularistic process
would receive less respect in the workplace.65 This lack of respect imposes
a serious additional hurdle to job advancement for these individuals, a
hurdle that is not present to the same degree for minority or female appli-
cants selected through a universalistic procedure.
A more sophisticated study has examined the effect of the selection pro-
cedure on beneficiaries' feelings of self-worth and belief in their own abil-
ities.6 6 This study found that the purported procedure of selection had a
strong impact on the perceptions of the female leaders:
These results provide strong evidence that sex-based preferential se-
lection procedures can have detrimental effects on leaders' self-
perceptions and self-evaluations, and that these detrimental effects
occur despite information about performance quality. When selected
selected (over qualified white males) through an affirmative action program that follows a pass-fail
qualifications barrier with disparate impact.
62. See Nacoste & Lehman, supra note 60, at 26-27 (individuals evaluate fairness of controlling
agency and agency's view of individual on basis of fairness of selection procedure); Nacoste, But Do
They Care?, supra note 60, at 185 (participants in universalistic procedure inferred that agency was
"more committed to fairness").
63. See Nacoste, But Do They Care?, supra note 60, at 185 (study found that "[tihe universalistic
condition led to greater willingness to apply . . . for a position with the agency than did the particu-
laristic condition").
64. See Nacoste, Social Psychology, supra note 60, at 130. Researchers have argued that this
reaction can also be found among nonbeneficiary whites, where a solely race-based decision-making
process is used. See Kluegel, "If There Isn't a Problem, You Don't Need a Solution," 28 AM. BEHAV.
St. 761, 776 (1985) (whites "will show a strong preference" for universalistic procedures, which
measure each applicant as an individual, over particularistic procedures).
65. See Murray, supra note 59 (discussing lack of respect shown to minority beneficiaries of
affirmative action).
66. Heilman, Simon & Repper, Intentionally Favored, Unintentionally Harmed? Impact of Sex-
Based Preferential Selection on Self Perceptions and Self-Evaluations, 72 J. APPLIED PSYCHOLOGY
62 (1987). In this study, a group of women took part in what they were told was a research project in
which they were to work with one other person (who was in fact a confederate posing as a male
student). Before the project began, the two workers were asked to complete an examination which was
then supposedly graded. Half of the women students were then told that they had scored higher than
their fellow participant and therefore would lead in the carrying out of the research project. The other
half were told that they had scored lower on the examination but were being chosen to lead anyway
because not enough women had signed up for the project. The participants then carried out the task
and were told how successful they had been in completing the task as compared to the rest of the
pairs. Id. at 63-64.
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on the basis of preference rather than merit, the women consistently
rated their performance more negatively, took less credit for success-
ful outcomes, and were less eager to persist in their leadership roles;
they also viewed themselves as more deficient in general leadership
skills.67
Women who were told that they had been selected on the basis of their
ability rather than their gender had fewer process-created doubts concern-
ing their self-worth. These findings indicate that universalistic procedures,
which focus on an applicant's skills along with her race or gender in mak-
ing a selection, are less likely than particularistic processes to cause the
internal barriers to job opportunities that stem from self-doubt.
The researchers in this study quickly recognized the importance of
these findings for employers who were shaping selection procedures:
This research has important implications for current personnel poli-
cies and practices. Although it is rare that competence is not at all a
factor when affirmative action plans are in operation, the common
perception is that it is not a major criterion for selection. Our re-
sults suggest that when this is the case, sex-based preferential selec-
tion can trigger a vicious cycle of negative self-regard for women
targeted for favored treatment. Ironically, this may happen to a wo-
man even when she truly is qualified for the position and would
have been hired had merit been the sole basis of selection. . . . [T]he
findings presented here . . . underscore the necessity of paying heed
to the way in which such programs are implemented and, in particu-
lar, of making sure that selection without regard to competence is not
believed to characterize affirmative action efforts.68
The consistent findings of these studies indicate that selection proce-
dures which are perceived as relying solely on an applicant's gender (or
by analogy, on an applicant's race) impose significant barriers to employ-
ment opportunities. Significantly, these barriers appear even when the
beneficiaries of these supposed sex-based procedures were told that they
had the necessary (or even superior) skills for the job. The studies reveal,
however, that such perception-based barriers are much less likely to be
imposed in cases where the applicants skills are also seen as an important
factor in the selection. These findings provide a strong sociological foun-
dation for the position put forward in this Note that courts should look to
public and workers' perceptions in distinguishing between pass-fail and
multicomponent procedures.
67. Id. at 66-67 (emphasis added).
68. Id. at 68 (emphasis added). The literature appears to be devoid of studies examining the
psychological effects of selection procedures on racial minorities.
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IV. THE "PERCEPTIONS APPROACH" AND EMPLOYMENT
PROCEDURES
Given the impact of employment procedures on perceptions of the qual-
ifications of minority and female workers, the distinction between pass-fail
barriers and multicomponent selection techniques assumes a new level of
importance. Although the number of minority or female applicants hired
by an employer may be the same whether she uses a pass-fail or mul-
ticomponent approach, the identifiable sex- or race-based selection found
in the former approach is far more likely to be perceived as unfair by
applicants and the public at large. Additionally, a pass-fail barrier with a
disparate impact results in a disproportionate number of minorities and
women from the original applicant pool being told explicitly that they are
unqualified. Even those minority and female applicants who do meet the
quality standard are often ultimately selected through an affirmative ac-
tion program where race or sex is seen as the main determinant for place-
ment. Use of a pass-fail barrier, therefore, also fuels the social myth of
racial or sexual superiority and undercuts the feelings of self-worth of
even those minority and female applicants who have the skills needed to
surmount the pass-fail barrier.69 A universalistic multicomponent process,
even one which makes an identical disparate determination at a particular
stage, is much less likely to have such an effect.70 The only result the
applicant can identify in a multicomponent approach is the end result,
where minority and female applicants are selected at a rate equal to that
of other applicants. This outward appearance does not give rise to percep-
tions of either inequity or inequality.
This analysis of the distinction between pass-fail barriers and mul-
ticomponent processes may be useful in resolving the circuit split that cur-
rently exists over the use of the bottom line defense. In Teal, the Supreme
Court rejected selection procedures that "foster[] . . .stratified job envi-
ronments to the disadvantage of minority citizens. '71 Pass-fail barriers
foster stratified job environments in at least three ways that are less likely
to arise from multicomponent processes. First, identifiable pass-fail barri-
ers, especially those known to have a disparate impact disadvantaging mi-
nority or female job applicants (for example, culturally-biased standard-
ized examinations or physical strength tests), may cause fewer minority
and female candidates to apply for a given job. Second, these procedures
can create self-doubt in the minds of those minority and female candidates
who do apply, doubt which is likely to spill over into job performance and
motivation. Third, pass-fail procedures impose an additional hurdle in job
69. See supra text accompanying notes 67-68.
70. See id.
71. Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440, 456 (1982) (quoting McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,
411 U.S. 792, 800 (1973)).
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advancement for minorities and women by creating the perception in
other workers that these workers did not earn their jobs in the first place.
The courts, therefore, should continue to prohibit the bottom line de-
fense where pass-fail barriers are used. Where an employer uses a mul-
ticomponent selection technique, however, the court's task will be some-
what more complex. Employers using a selection procedure generally
perceived as reinforcing perceptions of white male superiority and basing
ultimate bottom line selections on race or sex, rather than on a recognition
of qualifications, should not be able to rely upon the bottom line defense,
since such a process is likely to lead to the same barriers to opportunity as
a pass-fail procedure. Where the technique is seen by both minority and
majority workers as a selection based on universalistic concerns, however,
equality of placement at the bottom line should be a defense against title
VII claims.
A multicomponent procedure will be disfavored under this analysis to
the degree to which a "merit" component with a disparate impact is dis-
tinct and identifiable as important and relevant to the job applicants. 2 A
pass-fail barrier with a disparate impact on minorities and women falls to
one extreme in this analysis; it is a readily identifiable measure that pur-
ports to determine the overall ability of an applicant to perform a job
adequately. A single exam question falls to the other extreme, since appli-
cants will attribute to it little independent importance. Between these two
extremes, the court will apply a flexible standard aimed at determining
the effect of the procedure on applicants' perceptions."
This analysis provides a theory by which the decisions in Burney and
Brunet can be reconciled. In Burney, the court rejected a bottom line de-
fense where a physical training program and physical performance exami-
nation had a disparate impact on female police cadets. The physical re-
quirements generally did not constitute a pass-fail barrier,"' but were a
distinct and important part of the selection process. Further, fellow cadets
could easily observe and judge the performance of their contemporaries in
the ten week physical training program.75 Indeed, instructors subjectively
determined half of each cadet's score in this program by observation of
physical performance during the ten weeks.7 ' From these facts, one can
72. The court will thus, in part, be pursuing a similar course to that adopted by the Second
Circuit in Teal, supra text accompanying notes 22-24, except that the determining factor will be
whether the "barrier" is easily "identifiable" to the job applicants rather than to the court.
73. Given the difficulty in predicting the impact on public perceptions of an infinite number of
possible fact patterns, it would be inappropriate to predetermine a "bright-line" rule. Rather, as in
the establishment clause cases, infra notes 88-89 and accompanying text, courts would have to use
their discretion.
74. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
75. Burney v. City of Pawtucket, 559 F. Supp. 1089, 1095-96 (D.R.I. 1983) (women given de-
merits when they could not keep pace with men in calisthenics), appeal dismissed, 728 F.2d 547 (1st
Cir. 1984).
76. Id. at 1096.
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assume that the cadets were well aware of the male superiority in the
physical skills measured in the examination. Unless this superiority was
offset by an equally observable superiority by female cadets in another
qualification, the effect of these programs on the perceptions of the police
cadets would be similar to the effects of a program with a pass-fail
barrier.
In Brunet, on the other hand, the contested selection components were
individual subtests in an overall hiring test. All applicants went through
the entire testing process with much less ability to identify the results of
any one subtest." No one subtest was seen as having special importance.
Thus, a court using the "appearances" approach might uphold the bottom
line defense in this case, as did the Brunet court.
A. Legal Support Under Title VII For the Perceptions Analysis
While the language of title VII does not refer to public perceptions,
procedures that encourage perceptions of inequality and discourage ad-
vancements by minorities and women clearly violate the purpose behind
the statute. As the Griggs Court explained, "The objective of Congress in
the enactment of Title VII . . .was to achieve equality of employment
opportunities . . . ."" Title VII, the Court continued, prohibits "employ-
ment procedures or testing mechanisms that operate as 'built-in
headwinds' for minority groups." 9 The sociological evidence presented
above clearly demonstrates that pass-fail and similarly particularistic pro-
cedures with disparate impacts act as "built-in headwinds" by denying
minority and female applicants the opportunity to "earn" a job. Increased
perceptions of their inequality and decreased acceptance of affirmative ac-
tion hinder minorities and women as groups in their efforts to achieve
equal employment opportunity. The individual minority or female appli-
cant is either rejected as unqualified or is "given" a job because of his or
her under-privileged status.
As noted above, particularistic procedures are also likely to reduce the
number of minority and female job applicants. In finding a violation of
title VII in Dothard v. Rawlinson,0 the Supreme Court based its holding
in large part on the fact that the selection process was such that "other-
77. Brunet v. City of Columbus, 642 F. Supp. 1214, 1224 (S.D. Ohio 1986), appeal dismissed,
826 F.2d 1062 (6th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 1593 (1988). Only one of the challenged
components in Brunet, the physical component test, was readily observable by other applicants. A
description of the procedure used in conducting this test in subsequent years, however, indicates that
even here applicants had much less opportunity to determine the abilities of their fellow applicants
than was available to the cadets in Burney. The job applicants in Brunet were separated into groups
and took a short (five to ten minutes) physical test at ten minute intervals. Id. at 1231.
78. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 429 (1971).
79. Id. at 432 (emphasis added).
80. 433 U.S. 321 (1977).
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wise qualified people might be discouraged from applying . .8.1."" Par-
ticularistic procedures can also lead to internal (self-doubt) and external
(lack of respect) barriers to job advancement. In Teal, the Supreme Court
indicated that title VII prohibited such "'artificial, arbitrary and unneces-
sary' employer-created barriers to professional development .
B. Perceptions as Ground for Legal Doctrine
In Regents of the University of California v. Bakke,83 the Supreme
Court suggested perception-based reasoning similar to that proposed in
this Note. Justice Powell, announcing the judgment of a splintered Court,
found an affirmative action plan of the medical school at the University of
California at Davis to be unconstitutional. The medical school's plan set
aside sixteen out of one hundred places in the entering class for disadvan-
taged minority applicants. In rejecting this plan, Powell emphasized that
white applicants, "[n]o matter how strong their qualifications, quantitative
and extracurricular, . . . are never afforded the chance to compete with
applicants from the preferred groups for the special admission
seats .. "84 Justice Powell contrasted this program with a plan estab-
lished by Harvard College in which race was counted as a "plus" in an
individual's application. The Harvard plan, Powell argued, "treats each
applicant as an individual. . . . His qualifications would have been
weighed fairly and competitively."85
The distinction made by Justice Powell in Bakke is analogous to the
distinction at issue in this Note. The Davis plan, by explicitly excluding
individuals from consideration for admission for the sixteen set aside
places, caused race to become a particularized barrier. The Harvard plan,
by internalizing the racial consideration, utilized a multicomponent ap-
proach. Significantly, in response to Justice Brennan's argument that
there was no "sensible" distinction between the two school plans,8" Justice
Powell referred to the different effect that the two plans would have on
public perceptions: "Petitioner's program will be viewed as inherently un-
fair by the public generally as well as by applicants for admissions to
state universities. Fairness in individual competition for opportunities...
is a widely cherished American ethic . . . . As Mr. Justice Frankfurter
declared in another connection, 'U]ustice must satisfy the appearance of
justice.' "187 This distinction recognized by Powell in Bakke is the same
81. Id. at 330.
82. 457 U.S. 440, 451 (1982) (quoting Griggs, 401 U.S. at 431).
83. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
84. Id. at 319.
85. Id. at 318.
86. Id. at 378 (Brennan, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
87. Id. at 319 n.53 (citation omitted) (emphasis added). At least one observer has supported Jus-
tice Powell's distinction on the basis of public perceptions: "In terms of the appearance of jus-
tice-more particularly, in terms of the potential for generating racial resentment-there is a signifi-
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distinction advocated by this Note for bottom line defense cases. Further-
more, Justice Powell's concern for the perceptions that the Davis Plan
would generate indicates that the Court might be open to a similar per-
ception-based argument in title VII disparate impact cases.
The Supreme Court has already shown the willingness and competence
to measure the effects of perceptions of substantive law in the context of
the establishment clause. In School District of City of Grand Rapids v.
Ball, the Court held that
an important concern of the effects test [of the establishment clause]
is whether the symbolic union of church and state effected by the
challenged governmental action is sufficiently likely to be perceived
by adherents of the controlling denominations as an endorsement,
and by nonadherents as a disapproval, of their individual religious
choices.88
This past term, the Court again focused on the appearance of a govern-
ment action: "The Establishment Clause, at the very least, prohibits gov-
ernment from appearing to take a position on questions of religious belief
... ."89 These cases indicate that the perception-based analysis suggested
in this Note is well within the scope of the Court's jurisprudence.
Beyond the practical question of the competence of the courts to apply
the perception-based approach presented in this Note lie philosophical
questions arising from the approach's premise. By relying primarily on
outward appearances to shape public perceptions of affirmative action, the
proposal arguably relies on deception to bolster policies that would other-
wise be subject to strong opposition. The proposal thus seems to run afoul
of some scholars' admonitions against judicial subterfuge.90
The "perceptions approach," however, is not in fact deceptive. By re-
quiring employers to adopt more universalistic selection criteria, this Note
does not require employers to gloss over controversy. Rather, it requires
that employers approach their selection decisions in a manner that is more
consistent with the concept of equality in our society. The bottom line
defense would be available under the proposed theory, not where an em-
cant difference between a program like Davis's and one like Harvard's." Perry, Modern Equal
Protection: A Conceptualization and Appraisal, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 1023, 1049 (1979) (emphasis in
original).
88. 473 U.S. 373, 390 (1985) (emphasis added); see also Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 76
(1985) (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("The relevant issue is whether an objective observer . . . would
perceive [the statute] as a state endorsement of prayer in public schools."); Lynch v. Donnelly, 465
U.S. 668, 692 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (looking to effect of government practice "in reality
or public perception").
89. County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 109 S. Ct. 3086, 3101 (1989) (emphasis added); see also
Smith, Symbols, Perceptions, and Doctrinal Illusions; Establishment Neutrality and the "No En-
dorsement" Test, 86 MICH. L. REv. 266 (1987) (discussing role of perceptions in Court's analysis of
establishment clause cases).
90. See, e.g., Gerwirtz, Remedies and Resistance, 92 YALE L.J. 585, 666-74 (1983).
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ployer has "hidden" the discrimination or inequity in her selection pro-
cess, but rather where she has used a process that measures an applicant's
ability in such a way that race or sex, as such, is no longer the determina-
tive factor."
V. CONCLUSION
In the years following the Supreme Court's rejection of the bottom line
defense in Teal, lower courts have been unable to develop a coherent ap-
proach for evaluating the bottom line defense in the case of multicom-
ponent selection processes. This Note argues that the courts might resolve
this difficulty by inquiring into the psychological effects of different types
of selection procedures in employment. Employment selection procedures
not only determine an individual's chance to acquire a job or a promotion.
They also help to shape the understanding with which workers and the
rest of the public view affirmative action and equal employment
opportunity.
Particularistic race- or sex-based selection procedures, like the one used
in Teal, foster the perception that minorities and women are less qualified
for positions and are selected solely on the basis of their underprivileged
status. These perceptions impose barriers to job opportunities for minori-
ties and women. Universalistic selection procedures, on the other hand, do
not focus on an applicant's color or race but rely instead on a variety of
measures, which may include diversity of backgrounds, social skills, work
ethic, and scholastic skills, as well as affirmative action goals, in reaching
their decisions. These procedures, therefore, place more of a focus on the
qualifications of the applicants and are consequently less likely to foster
the adverse perceptions that can impede opportunities for minority and
female job applicants. By appreciating the relevance of selection proce-
dures to public perceptions, courts can end the confusion that has resulted
from Teal and limit the bottom line defense to those cases in which it does
not defeat the underlying purpose of title VII, namely to free society from
racial or sexual inequality in perception and in fact.
91. There are, admittedly, some positions, such as dock worker, where physical distinctions be-
tween the sexes are determinative. While universalistic approaches may be less realistic for these
positions, the number of jobs that are solely based on physical strength is limited.
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